Cognitive symptoms in US government personnel in Cuba:The mending is worse than the hole by Della Sala, Sergio et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive symptoms in US government personnel in Cuba
Citation for published version:
Della Sala, S, McIntosh, RD, Cubelli, R, Kacmarski, JA, Miskey, HM & Shura, RD 2018, 'Cognitive
symptoms in US government personnel in Cuba: The mending is worse than the hole', Cortex, vol. 108, pp.
287-288. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.10.002
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.cortex.2018.10.002
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Cortex
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. Nov. 2019
  
Cognitive Symptoms in US Government Personnel in Cuba:  
The mending is worse than the hole 
 
Sergio Della Salaa, Robert D. McIntosha, Roberto Cubellib,  
Jason A. Kacmarskic, Holly M. Miskeyd & Robert D. Shurad 
 
a) Human Cognitive Neuroscience, Psychology, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK 
b) Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, Italy 
c) Health Psychology Section, Veterans Affairs Eastern Colorado Health Care System, Denver, 
CO, USA 
d) Mental Health & Behavioral Science Service Line, Salisbury Veterans Affairs Medical 
Center, Salisbury, North Carolina, USA 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reﬂect the position or policy of the Department of Veterans Affairs or the U.S. Government. 
 
 
 
  
A recent paper published in JAMA reported on a case-series of 21 people with cognitive 
complaints compatible with post-concussive symptoms (Swanson et al., 2018). These individuals 
were US government personnel who had been working in Havana, Cuba, and the proposed cause 
of their symptoms was unusual auditory phenomena of an unknown origin. Percentile scores 
from a battery of 37 neuropsychological tests were provided for six patients in the study, and 
each patient was classified as cognitively impaired if scoring below the 40th percentile on at 
least one of these tests. We have strongly criticised these methods as inconsistent with any 
recognised practice for evidence-based neuropsychology (Della Sala & Cubelli, 2018; Shura, 
Kacmarski, & Miskey, 2018), and with statistical logic (Della Sala & McIntosh, 2018). We are 
not surprised that Swanson and colleagues found that all six patients were impaired: when using 
the 40th percentile, 40% of people will fail each test and the chances of anyone passing 37 tests 
without an impairment being diagnosed are vanishingly small. 
Remarkably, in a subsequent rebuttal to this and other criticisms, the authors did not 
defend their idiosyncratic choice of a 40th percentile threshold, but implied that they used some 
other criterion, as follows: “Within-individual deviations from an average performance are 
considered signs of brain dysfunction. Percentile scores in our report showed that all impaired 
patients had several scores that deviated by more than 1 SD from their respective means, some 
exceeding 2 SDs, which translates to more than 40 percentile points below their means (below 
10th percentile relative to their average performance). This meets standard criteria for 
neuropsychological impairment…” (Hampton, Swanson, & Smith, 2018, p. 604). We are unsure 
what this confusing, ambiguous statement means. We can imagine two possible interpretations, 
each of which is problematic, and we consider them briefly in turn. 
Hampton and colleagues explicitly refer to “within-individual” deviations from ”their 
respective means,” suggesting that they calculated each individual’s mean (percentile) score 
across the 37 tests, and then expressed each test score in terms of how many standard deviations 
it fell from this mean (i.e., a within-subject z-score). Within-subject profiling can be a valid 
approach to understanding variations in a person’s abilities across domains, but such profiles can 
only be evaluated by reference to the distribution of between-test differences in a normative 
sample (e.g., Binder, 2009; Oakes et al, 2013). The within-subject approach that Hampton and 
colleagues’ statement implies has no normative point of reference, and would be meaningless.  
As noted by Oakes et al. (2013), people with higher intellectual ability, as one may 
suspect the government employees were by the virtue of their positions and education, generally 
demonstrate greater variability in their abilities: “Individuals with high intellectual ability show 
much more variability in their performance than individuals with average function” (pp. 141-
142). Even without these interpretive problems, a within-subject z-score would only be 
meaningful to calculate if the within-subject distribution of test scores satisfies the parametric 
assumption of normality, but this assumption was violated in four of the six individuals reported 
by Swanson and colleagues (2018). Regardless, the relevant z-scores are not reported, nor indeed 
are they mentioned, in Swanson and colleagues' original paper. 
A simpler interpretation of their statement, though less compatible with the language of 
“within-individual deviations”, would be that Hampton and colleagues are implying that the 
actual cut-off per-test was 1 standard deviation below the normative mean. This would be 
equivalent to a lower cut-off at the 16th percentile or a T-score of 40. While this too is a liberal 
cut-off, it is not entirely without precedent (see Strauss et al, 2006, p. 91). Further, a 2 standard 
deviation cut-off would be approximately equivalent to the 2nd percentile, and a much less 
controversial standard for impairment (although it should not be applied across multiple tests 
without considering the number of test scores examined). By this latter criterion, one of the 
patients tested (case 6), did perform more poorly than would be expected by chance, scoring at or 
below the second percentile on six of 37 tests (exact binomial test, p < .0001), but the other five 
performed well within normal limits (case 2 failed two tests, and no other patient failed any). 
An old Venetian saying seems very apt here: “Xe pèso el tacòn del buso” - the mending 
is worse than the hole. Hampton and colleagues have tried to patch over an unjustifiable 
threshold for impairment reported in the original paper with an even less cogent statement of 
their actual criterion in the rebuttal. Only two things are clear in this murky matter: that the 
crucial criterion for cognitive impairment was mis-stated in the original paper, and that the 
neuropsychological data presented do not support the conclusion that whatever happened in 
Cuba resulted in persistent cognitive decline. 
It is imperative that neuropsychology as a field be presented in an accurate manner, 
especially in such influential and respected outlets as JAMA. From a clinical standpoint, 
misdiagnosing patients as impaired can even have iatrogenic effects in which the patients can 
come to behave in ways consistent with the alleged impairment. Researchers have an ethical 
responsibility to avoid misdiagnosis, as well as a scientific duty to be clear and accurate. We 
contend that Swanson et al. (2018) have fallen short on both counts.  
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